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Abstract
In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard.
Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas.
Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The eﬀort
put forth by either agent contributes to the firm’s success, but is not verifiable. As
a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards ineﬃciently low venture capital
support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs
advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place,
limitations on loss oﬀ-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture
capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed start-
ups are detrimental in our framework.
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1 Introduction
Innovative new firms embody great potential, but also high risks. Typically, entrepreneurs
have no finished product yet and cannot show any feedback from the market. Entrepre-
neurs tend to be technically well trained, but lack a decent track record in business. They
cannot oﬀer suﬃcient collateral when searching for outside finance. In short, they may
have great ideas, but lack experience and money. They need informed capital which com-
bines investment finance and managerial expertise. Venture capitalists (VCs), in contrast,
possess both money and managerial know-how. They carefully screen new projects, they
taylor financial contracts to realign incentives of entrepreneurs with their own interests,
and subsequently oﬀer advice and monitoring of the start-ups. There is clear evidence
that venture capital in the U.S. eﬀectively promotes the professionalization of young firms.
VC-backed firms tend to have a higher chance of survival, are faster in introducing their
products to the market, and are more profitable than other new firms. (See the evidence
presented in Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002), Kortum and Lerner (2000), and Kaplan
and Stromberg (2002), among others.)
Relatively few studies, Botazzi and DaRin (2001) and Bascha and Walz (2001) among
them, have analyzed the involvement of European venture capital in new business creation.
They paint a less impressive picture of venture capital in Europe. In particular, Botazzi
and DaRin demonstrate lacking performance of VC-backed firms, in that they do not
significantly perform better than firms with standard bank finance. Bascha and Walz find
that VCs in Germany use considerably less sophisticated financial instruments than their
American counterparts. The consensus seems to be that enough capital is raised, but VCs
often neglect the intensive coaching of their portfolio firms. Obviously then, public policy
should not so much focus on the mere quantity, but rather on the quality of European
VC and provide incentives to enhance VC support of new firms.
In this paper, we consider the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for VC support of
young firms. We focus on the eﬀects of capital gains taxes and investment subsidies. A key
aspect of the analysis is the double moral hazard that results from the need to put in joint
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eﬀort. While the entrepreneur tends to focus on technological aspects such as product
development, the VC draws on her commercial experience and industry knowledge to
provide managerial support and to promote the professionalization of the firm. Neither
eﬀort is verifiable and contractible. To provide incentives for both parties to supply eﬀort,
an equity contract becomes preferable. Still, an ineﬃciency remains when both parties
simultaneously invest eﬀort in the venture, but must share the resulting profits. While
each party bears the full cost of her extra eﬀort, marginal gains accrue to all members of
the team which impairs the incentives for joint eﬀort.
Within this setting, we examine the eﬀects of introducing a uniform capital gains
tax on both entrepreneurs and VCs. Not only does the tax retard entrepreneurship; it
results in a first order welfare loss even if the tax is kept small. By cutting into profits,
it impairs incentives of VCs to supply managerial inputs which are already too weak at
the outset. Further, policy makers frequently call for tax relief on physical investment
spending by innovative start-up firms. In our model, an investment subsidy indeed boosts
entrepreneurship but, somewhat unexpectedly, results in a welfare loss. Because the
subsidy succeeds to boost entrepreneurship, it expands the industry, depresses venture
returns and thereby diminishes incentives for VC support. Being already ineﬃciently low
at the outset, a further cut in managerial inputs must deteriorate welfare. A final aspect
of taxation of new firms concerns the treatment of losses. Being high-risk undertakings,
some firms fail entirely while others register high profits. When a capital gains tax with
complete loss oﬀset is in place, a restriction of loss oﬀsets is often thought to hinder
entrepreneurship and be detrimental to welfare. We demonstrate, though, that if the
extra revenue created by denying full loss oﬀset is used to cut the capital gains tax rate,
the combined eﬀect will be welfare improving.
The paper oﬀers two important contributions to the research on venture capital. First,
it considers the real eﬀects of venture capital by showing how it helps to expand a small
innovative sector of the economy, and second, it oﬀers a formal analysis of how policy
aﬀects venture capital support in start-ups. The finance literature now boasts a wealth
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of contributions on the design of financial contracts in financing entrepreneurial firms
(some examples are Black and Gilson (1998), Gompers and Lerner (1999), Kaplan and
Stromberg (2000, 2001), Repullo and Suarez (1999), Lülfesmann (1999) and Schmidt
(2002)), whereas there is much less work on how venture capital aﬀects entrepreneurship
in equilibrium (see, however, Michelacci and Suarez (2002), Inderst and Müller (2003),
and Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2001)). Michelacci and Suarez (2002) and Inderst and
Müller (2003) consider the relation between capital market characteristics and start-up
activity, and they point out important search ineﬃciencies as well as contracting and
liquidity externalities. They do not, however, analyze in depth the eﬀects of tax and
other public policy instruments.
The public finance literature, in turn, contains only little rigorous analysis of public
policy in meaningful models of VC backed entrepreneurship. The exceptions are Poterba
(1989a,b), Gompers and Lerner (1998) and Gordon (1998) who examine capital gains and
diﬀerential corporate and personal taxation. Their contributions do not, however, feature
detailed modeling of the joint incentives of entrepreneurs and VCs, nor any welfare-based
evaluation of tax policy.
This paper continues our previous work on taxation and entrepreneurship. Keuschnigg
and Nielsen (2001, 2003) have focused on the eﬀects of taxes, when entrepreneurs are risk
averse, and have explored the trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentive provision under
one-sided moral hazard. This paper is closest to Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002), where
we have considered the case of risk neutrality and have introduced double moral hazard to
focus more sharply on the incentives of VC firms in supporting their portfolio companies.
The current paper extends these analyses in three important ways: (i) We show how tax
and subsidy rules can replicate a budget-breaking third party as introduced by Holmstrom
(1982) in order to attain a first best equilibrium. (ii) We analyse the role of loss oﬀset
provision in capital gains taxation. More specifically, we show that a policy of tax cut
cum base broadening, i.e. restricting loss oﬀsets and using the proceeds to cut the capital
gains tax rate, can be welfare improving. And (iii), we analyze more completely the role of
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investment subsidies. This experiment is important, since most of the real world policies
to promote innovative start-up firms subsidize the cost of capital. One of the important
insights of the paper is that these subsidies are not performance-related and therefore
do not help to strengthen incentives. They eﬀectively reduce welfare if one allows for
general equilibrium eﬀects on venture returns. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2001, 2003)
and Keuschnigg (2002) consider the interaction of incentives for entrepreneurial eﬀort
and VC support with the optimal portfolio size of a VC. For simplicity, the current paper
abstracts from optimal portfolio choice by restricting to the simpler case of linear eﬀort
costs.
We introduce our model in section 2. Section 3 shows how a capital gains tax and
other tax-subsidy schemes aﬀect entrepreneurship, VC support, and welfare. Section 4
considers a more narrowly focused policy that oﬀers VC firms a lower tax rate on capital
gains but denies full loss oﬀset. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy
2.1 Overview
Consider a simple economy with a large number of agents, N . Individuals may have a
business idea and start a firm in the entrepreneurial sector, or else they take a safe job
in the traditional sector. An occupational choice decision splits the population into L
workers and E entrepreneurs,
N = L+E. (1)
Two goods are supplied. One unit of labor yields one unit of the traditional good which
is assumed to be the numeraire. The unit input-output coeﬃcient fixes the wage rate at
w = 1, and aggregate output amounts to L. The innovative good pays a relative price
V . Its production is inherently risky. An entrepreneur who puts in high eﬀort, is able to
produce one good with probability P > 0, but nothing with probability 1−P . By the law
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of large numbers, a fraction P of entrepreneurs succeeds, yielding an aggregate supply of
the innovative good equal to P ·E. Denoting demand per individual for traditional goods
by XD and for innovative goods by D, market clearing requires
ND = P · E, NXD = L. (2)
Entrepreneurs lack both resources and commercial experience to develop their business
idea. They team up with a VC that has managerial know-how and money to pay for the
start-up cost. Given a fixed number F of VC firms, each one is involved in funding and
advising E/F start-ups on average.1 The output from the start-up is the result of a joint
eﬀort by the entrepreneur who contributes her technological know-how, and the VC who
supports the venture with advice. A VC generates a net of tax profit πF per project.
All start-up firms are assumed symmetric. Dividends are distributed among households,
giving πFE = NΠ in the aggregate, where Π is a uniform dividend per household from
equally distributed ownership of VC firms.
Disposable income yi of an agent depends on her occupation. Taking account of
the price normalization w = 1, and denoting a possible wage subsidy by SL (SL < 0
indicating a wage tax), income of a worker amounts to 1+SL+Π. Income from start-up
firms is divided between entrepreneurs and VCs. Since a firm produces one unit of the
innovative good, its value is V if it is successful, and zero if it fails. A start-up firm
thus generates an expected capital gain of PV − (1− z)I over the private start-up cost.
Physical investment I uses the traditional good and is possibly subsidized by government
at a rate z. Since the entrepreneur has no other income or wealth, she cannot pay for the
investment expenditure. She thus sells a share 1 − s to a VC for a price (1 − z)I + B,
which covers the entire start-up cost plus an up-front payment B. With this deal, the
1We do not explicitly determine an optimal number of portfolio companies per VC as is done in
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2001, 2003). Average portfolio size is implicitly determined in equilibrium.
Moreover, VCs are modelled as “atomless” which keeps the analysis simple without changing the results.
This is verified by the analysis of Keuschnigg (2003), where VCs are modeled as real persons with
alternative job opportunities.
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entrepreneur’s expected income or capital gain amounts to sPV + B. In the presence of
taxes, the entrepreneur must pay a capital gains tax on the initial deal, τEB, plus a tax
upon realization of her remaining share, τEsPV in expected value. Taking account of a
potential lump-sum subsidy SE to entrepreneurs, they derive (on top of the profits from
the VC sector Π) an expected disposable income from the firm of
πE =
¡
1− τE
¢
(sPV +B) + SE. (3)
Summing up and taking into account that the venture may succeed or fail, per capita
income of agent i is
yi =



1 + SL +Π worker,¡
1− τE
¢
(sV +B) + SE +Π successful entrepreneur,¡
1− τE
¢
B + SE +Π unsuccessful entrepreneur.
(4)
A VC faces a tax on capital gains at rate τF . If the venture is successful, the VC’s net
income or capital gains,
¡
1− τF
¢
(1− s)V − ((1− z) I +B), is fully taxed. However, if
the venture fails, we assume that only a part 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 of the resulting loss (1− z) I +B
qualifies for deduction against the tax. Full loss oﬀset corresponds to ξ = 1, whereas
limited loss oﬀset implies ξ < 1. With probability of success P , the VC can thus deduct
all initial outlays (1− z) I +B against the tax. With probability 1−P , only a share ξ of
the initial outlays are tax deductible. Hence, the eﬀective degree of tax deductibility is
measured by the parameter ψ ≡ P + (1− P ) ξ.2 Utilizing this, the VC’s expected profit
or capital gain πF per firm becomes P
¡
1− τF
¢
[(1− s)V − (1− z)I −B]− (1− P )(1−
τF ξ)[(1− z)I +B], or
πF =
¡
1− τF
¢
(1− s)PV −
¡
1− ψτF
¢
[(1− z)I +B]. (5)
The government assumes a limited role only. Ignoring the provision of public goods,
2Clearly, ψ < 1 with imperfect loss oﬀset, and ψ = 1 with full loss oﬀset. Note that we implicitly
assume that a VC finances a portfolio of firms. Free entry in VC finance, as we later assume, means that
a given number of VC firms finance more portfolio companies each.
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it raises taxes to pay for various subsidies. The government budget constraint is
τE (sPV +B)E + τF [(1− s)PV − ψ ((1− z) I +B)]E = SEE + SLL+ zIE. (6)
Now use equations (1) and (3)—(6) to write aggregate disposable income Y as
Y = (πE +Π)E +
¡
1 + SL +Π
¢
L = L+ (PV − I)E. (7)
Agents spend disposable income to buy quantities D and X of innovative and traditional
goods, respectively. Equating spending Y = N(V D +X) with income in (7), we have
V (ND − PE) +
¡
NXD − L
¢
= 0, XD = X + IE/N. (8)
Total demand NXD for the traditional good stems from households’ consumption X per
individual and from investment I per project in the entrepreneurial sector. Walras’ Law
holds: market clearing ND = PE for innovative goods also implies equilibrium in the
traditional sector, NXD = L.
2.2 Private Decision Making
Having made an occupational choice, workers and entrepreneurs supply eﬀort and spend
on goods. VC firms finance and advise start-ups and distribute profits to households.
Starting an entrepreneurial firm requires a joint eﬀort by the entrepreneur and the VC. The
entrepreneur contributes her technological knowledge, the VC firm helps with managerial
and market expertise. Both parties are assumed to incur intangible eﬀort costs that are
not verifiable and cannot be contracted upon. Their relationship is subject to double moral
hazard as in Repullo and Suarez (1999), Lülfesmann (1999), Casamatta (2002), Schmidt
(2002) and Inderst and Müller (2003), for example. The inputs of the two parties are
required simultaneously, and that of the entrepreneur is assumed to be critical for the
success of the start-up. This feature results from the entrepreneur’s eﬀort being discrete,
e ∈ {0, 1}, giving eﬀort costs l (e) ∈ {0, β}. The VC also adds value to the firm in terms
of advice a which is taken to be continuous. In doing so the VC incurs an intangible cost
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of eﬀort which is assumed to be linear, l(a) = a. The success probability of the start-up
is specified as
P = e · p (a) , p (a) = a1−θ/ (1− θ) , 0 < θ < 1. (9)
In sum, the entrepreneur’s expected profit income πE in (3) depends on her own as
well as the VC’s eﬀort which jointly determine the success probability as in (9). The same
goes for the VC’s income πF in (5).
The venture capital cycle involves the following sequence of events. 1. The government
sets tax policy, i.e. τE, τF , ξ, z, SE, and SL; 2. The VC buys an equity stake 1 − s at
a price (1 − z)I + B; 3. Potential entrepreneurs accept or reject the deal (occupational
choice); 4. VCs and entrepreneurs simultaneously supply eﬀorts e, a subject to double
moral hazard; 5. Nature resolves risk and, thus, determines outcome; 6. Agents choose
consumption conditional on their income. As usual, the model is solved backwards.
2.2.1 Preferences and Demand
For simplicity, agents are endowed with separable preferences over consumption and eﬀort
cost. We normalize the worker’s eﬀort to zero, li = 0 if i ∈ L. In contrast, the entrepre-
neur’s eﬀort e ∈ {0, 1} is discrete and gives rise to low or high eﬀort cost, li ∈ {0, β} with
β > 0 for i ∈ E. Consumption demand for the two goods is decided only after eﬀort has
been expended and individual income yi has been determined. At that stage, consumers
maximize utility net of a given eﬀort level that was previously sunk,
U i∗ = max
Di,Xi
©
u
¡
Di
¢
+Xi − li s.t. X i + V Di ≤ yi
ª
. (10)
Utility is assumed separable which eliminates income eﬀects. In our simple general equi-
librium framework, we can therefore separately solve for equilibrium in the entrepreneurial
sector much like in a partial equilibrium model. Since subutility u (Di) is identical for
all agents and satisfies u0 (Di) > 0 > u00 (Di), demand for the innovative good is the
same for everyone, Di = D. It will be convenient to adopt the isoelastic specification
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u (D) = φ1/η ·D1−1/η/ (1− 1/η) which yields
u0
¡
Di
¢
= V, D = φV −η. (11)
Demand for the traditional good then follows from the budget, Xi = yi−V D, and reflects
the individuals’ diﬀerent incomes. Substituting back into the utility function, we obtain
indirect utility (conditional on eﬀort)
U i∗ = yi − li + CS, CS = u (D)− V D. (12)
Consumer surplus associated with consumption of innovative goods, denoted by CS, may
also be obtained by integrating the inverse demand from (10),
CS =
Z D(V )
0
D−1 (z) dz − V D (V ) , (13)
where D−1 (z) = u0 (z) is marginal utility from the z’th unit of the good. Since agents
consume the same quantity D independent of income, CS is likewise the same for all.
2.2.2 Eﬀort Choice
Funding and advising entrepreneurial firms must be suﬃciently profitable; otherwise VCs
would close down operations. To break even, the expected capital gains net of taxes must
cover not only the eﬀective price paid for the equity stake, but also the VC’s intangible
eﬀort cost. The VC’s problem consists of structuring the deal, i.e. proposing to buy a
stake 1 − s for a price (1 − z)I + B, and subsequently oﬀering a level of support a to
maximize the surplus πF − a.3 Using (5), we have
Ω = max
s,B,a
©¡
1− τF
¢
(1− s) · ep (a) · V − ¡1− ψ · τF¢Q− aª (14)
subject to participation and incentive compatibility constraints,
PCE : πE − β =
¡
1− τE
¢
[p (a) sV +B] + SE − β ≥ 1 + SL, (i)
ICE :
¡
1− τE
¢
p (a) sV − β ≥ 0, (ii)
ICF : max
a
©¡
1− τF
¢
ep (a) (1− s)V −
¡
1− ψ (e, a, ξ) τF
¢
[(1− z)I +B]− a
ª
.(iii)
3As we later introduce a zero-profit constraint for VCs, it is actually not restrictive to assume that
the VC has all the bargaining power.
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A value ψ = 1 implies perfect loss oﬀset. With incomplete loss oﬀset, however, the
tax variable ψ (e, a, ξ) = ep (a) + (1− ep (a)) ξ depends on the entrepreneur’s eﬀort, the
VC’s advice, and the share of losses ξ that qualifies for a tax deduction. With ξ < 1, the
government fully participates in the capital gains, but only partly shares in the losses from
unsuccessful investments. This raises the eﬀective tax burden on VCs. With imperfect
loss oﬀset, the VC may reduce the eﬀective tax load by raising ψ, i.e. advising more
intensively and making losses less likely.
Following the principle of backward induction, we now turn to eﬀort choice. Antic-
ipating how eﬀort aﬀects income and utility, the VC and entrepreneur simultaneously
choose eﬀort. At this stage, B, s, and V plus policy parameters are all fixed. According
to (12), expected utility of an entrepreneur conditional on eﬀort is πE − l (e) + Π + CS
with πE given by (3) and (9). The entrepreneur’s choice of eﬀort e ∈ {0, 1} is determined
by the incentive constraint ICE in (14.ii) which compares utility from high eﬀort with
utility from low eﬀort. Income terms that do not depend on eﬀort cancel from both sides
of the inequality, leaving only
¡
1− τE
¢
sep (a)V − l (e) to be maximized. High eﬀort
gives l = β and P = p (a) while low eﬀort results in l = 0 and P = 0. If the incentive
constraint ICE in (14.ii) is satisfied, the entrepreneur will expend high eﬀort indeed. Her
willingness to expend eﬀort increases with her profit share s, while a higher capital gains
tax τE reduces the return to eﬀort.
The VC chooses managerial eﬀort to maximize the remaining part of income in (14.iii).
The first order condition is
Ω0 = ep0 (a) · £¡1− τF ¢ (1− s)V + (1− ξ) τFQ¤− 1 = 0. (15)
The second order condition Ω00 < 0 is fulfilled by the concavity of p (a). Note first that the
VC would never want to waste any managerial eﬀort (a = 0) if the entrepreneur shirks
(e = 0). Eﬀorts are complements. Given high entrepreneurial eﬀort, the marginal benefits
of advice in (15) are twofold. First, the VC obtains the return on its shares with a higher
probability. Second, more advice lowers the probability that the portfolio company fails,
and thereby allows the VC to avoid the extra tax cost due to imperfect loss oﬀset. With
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full loss oﬀset, ξ = 1, the government participates equally in gains and losses, and the
extra benefit of reducing the overall tax bill from the VC portfolio vanishes. Note also
that, for a given tax rate, a limitation of loss oﬀset, i.e. a reduction of ξ, strengthens
the incentives for advice. Taxation then punishes the VC more severely when she allows
the business to fail. A smaller capital gains tax and a larger equity stake 1− s similarly
strengthen the VC’s consulting incentives.
2.2.3 The Equity Contract
The next step backwards is to the entrepreneur’s occupational choice which is reflected
in the participation constraint PCE in (14.i). According to (12), expected indirect utility
from entrepreneurship is πE+Π−β+CS, while utility from a worker’s salary is 1+SL+
Π+CS. Since the terms Π and CS are the same for both occupations, they cancel from
the participation constraint, giving rise to (14.i). If the venture contract is suﬃciently
generous, i.e. if it includes a large upfront payment B and leaves a large residual share s,
agents will find it attractive to give up a safe job and start a firm.
The last step to be solved is the VC’s proposal for a contract. In specifying the contract
terms by means of choosing s and B, the VC must anticipate how the proposal aﬀects the
entrepreneur’s willingness to accept the deal, and how it determines the entrepreneur’s
and her own incentives to expend eﬀort, once the firm is started and the initial investment
costs are sunk. Since by assumption the entrepreneur possesses no own wealth, the equity
injection by the VC must at least cover the start-up cost (1− z)I. Apart from that, the
VC obviously wants to obtain a large stake 1− s at a small price Q (leaving a small share
s to the entrepreneur). Starting from a situation of high eﬀort e = 1, and anticipating
how eﬀorts respond to variations in profit sharing, the VC cuts the entrepreneur’s share
to boost her own profits, dΩ/ds = −
¡
1− τF
¢
p (a)V < 0. Note that the eﬀect of s on
Ω via a disappears due to the envelope theorem on account of (15). The VC cuts s until
ICE becomes tight. A further reduction would destroy all profits as the entrepreneur
starts shirking. Consequently, ICF and ICE jointly determine advice plus the minimum
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profit share s that induces high eﬀort by the entrepreneur.
Given a and s, we find that the VC cuts the price B+(1− z) I to raise her own profits.
She will always have to pay for (1− z) I, but she may oﬀer a smaller upfront payment
B. However, PCE prevents a too low price, as otherwise entrepreneurs would not want
to start a firm at all. As ICE in (14.ii) must hold with equality, PCE in (14.i) gives the
minimum upfront payment B which makes entrepreneurs accept the proposed deal,4
B =
¡
1 + SL − SE
¢
/
¡
1− τE
¢
. (16)
2.2.4 Industry Equilibrium
The eﬀorts of entrepreneurs and VCs, e = 1 and a; the success probability P = p (a); and
the contract parameters s and B are now all determined. With E projects or start-up
entrepreneurs, industry supply becomes p (a)E. The induced eﬀort levels and supply
depend parametrically on project value, or market price V , for the innovative good. We
assume a competitive VC sector where firms compete down profits from VC investments
until they just suﬃce to cover the managerial eﬀort cost of advice. In other words, VC
firms must generate positive monetary profits to compensate for the intangible eﬀort
cost of advice. This yields the “zero profit” condition Ω = πF − a = 0 as yet another
equilibrium condition, or
πF = a. (17)
A variation in the competitive venture return V , of course, feeds back to the level of advice
and profit shares. It is thus determined jointly by the free entry condition together with
the other conditions relating to the venture contract and the level of advice. The equi-
librium number of entrepreneurs then follows from demand (11) and the market clearing
condition ND = p (a)E. The remaining part of the population picks up safe jobs in the
traditional sector.
4In an untaxed equilibrium, B = 1. We shall only look at values of subsidies so that 1 + SL > SE
always holds. In consequence, B is always positive, and the participation constraint is never slack.
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2.2.5 Welfare
For an evaluation of policy initiatives we need a welfare measure. By the participation
constraint in (14.i), indirect utility in (12) will be equal for workers and entrepreneurs,
U∗E = U∗L. Household income includes positive monetary profits from ownership of VC
firms. Since these profits are merely a compensation for intangible eﬀort costs, we must
subtract them from profits. Adding up indirect utilities of agents, subtracting VC eﬀort
costs, and using NΠ = πFE = aE by the zero profit condition, the welfare measure
becomes
U∗ = U∗EE + U∗LL− aE =
¡
1 + SL + CS
¢
N. (18)
2.3 Eﬃciency
Agents maximize each their own surplus, taking the actions of others as given. Pri-
vate decisions of entrepreneurs and VCs may not achieve the eﬃcient solution which
would maximize the joint surplus of each start-up project. The surplus of entrepre-
neurs is expected net profits minus eﬀort cost minus foregone wages, πE − β − 1 − SL,
which is zero by the participation constraint. The surplus per venture of the VC is Ω in
(14), while net tax revenue or government surplus per firm amounts to τE (sPV +B) +
τF [(1− s)PV − (1− z)I −B] − zI − SE + SL.5 Adding these surpluses of the three
parties we obtain the joint surplus per venture, denoted by Φ:
Φ = e · [p (a)V − β]− a− I − 1. (19)
Quite obviously, the optimal eﬀort levels that maximize joint surplus are e∗ = 1 and
p0 (a∗)V = 1, (20)
which compares with (15), i.e. (1− s) · p0 (a) ¡1− τF ¢V = 1.
5When one more entrepreneur is recruited from the pool of workers, the government pays SE instead
of SL, yielding a net reduction of the surplus equal to −
¡
SE − SL
¢
. We keep the loss oﬀset parameters
ψ, ξ at unity in this section.
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Proposition 1 (Eﬃciency) (a) In the untaxed equilibrium, advice is too low, a < a∗.
(b) The optimal revenue subsidy to induce the first best level of advice is
¡
1− τF∗
¢
(1− s∗) = 1 ⇒ τF∗ = −s
∗
1− s∗ < 0. (21)
Proof. (a) Comparing (20) with the untaxed version of (15), i.e. (1− s) ·p0 (a)V = 1,
implies a < a∗. (b) Conditions (20) and (15) yield a = a∗ only if (21) holds.
In the absence of taxes, the private level of advice is smaller than the eﬃcient one
because the financier gets only a part 1− s of the full social return p0 (a)V from her extra
eﬀort. The need to share profits with the entrepreneur to enlist her critical eﬀort impairs
the incentive of the VC. The market equilibrium is therefore biased towards an ineﬃciently
low level of support. Since the entrepreneur’s eﬀort is assumed critical, it must be kept at
unity and therefore cannot be underprovided.6 The government can, in principle, induce
the eﬃcient level of support. It needs to strengthen the marginal private return on advice
by subsidizing VC revenues at the rate given in (21). With this policy, private incentives
in (15) are aligned to yield, for any given price V , the socially optimal level of advice
a∗. Knowing a∗, ICE in (14.ii), s∗p (a∗)V = β, then implies an optimal profit share
s∗ = s (a∗), again conditional on V . In essence, our result on the optimal revenue subsidy
implies that the government can play the role of a budget-breaking third party that was
introduced by Holmstrom (1982) as a means to obtain a first best equilibrium.
Since the ‘capital gains subsidy’ boosts VC profits, the government could impose a
tax on start-up investment z∗ < 0 which must be paid out of the VC’s pockets, since the
entrepreneur has no own resources. The rationale for this policy is that the VC herself,
rather than the general tax payer, would pay the revenue subsidy that she receives. Since
the start-up tax is paid before any eﬀort is expended, it is not performance-related and
therefore not harmful when the VC finally chooses the level of advice. The revenue subsidy,
in contrast, is given only after eﬀort is chosen, and only in case of success. Anticipating
6As demonstrated in our companion paper, Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002), entrepreneurial eﬀort
would be similarly discouraged by profit sharing, if it were continuous.
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a larger return to eﬀort on account of the subsidy, the VC is keen to increase support.7
Setting other policy parameters to zero, an optimal and self-financing policy is given by
(21) and
z∗I = τF∗ [(1− s∗) p∗V − (1− z)I −B] , B = 1, (22)
Note that this policy induces general equilibrium eﬀects that will aﬀect the innovative
goods price and, therefore, venture returns. The V appearing in (22) will be diﬀerent
from the value holding at τF = 0.
Another way of verifying this line of argument is to check how a marginal introduction
of a subsidy aﬀects joint surplus in (19),
dΦ
dτF = [p
0 (a)V − 1] dadτF =
£
1− (1− s)
¡
1− τF
¢¤
p0 (a)V dadτF , (23)
where the second equality uses (15) (with ξ = 1). The square bracket indicates the
wedge between the VC’s optimal marginal return p0V and what she receives via the
privately agreed profit share plus the tax subsidy, (1− s)
¡
1− τF
¢
p0V . In the untaxed
state, τF = 0, this wedge amounts to sp0V which is the external benefit of the VC’s eﬀort,
i.e. the positive spillover to the entrepreneur . Since a tax reduces advice,8 da/dτF < 0,
introducing a small subsidy strengthens advice, and thereby yields a first order increase
in joint surplus. When the subsidy is eventually raised up to its optimal level listed in
(21), the first order gain in joint surplus vanishes.
One might wonder whether the highly sophisticated VC industry could not come up
with its own market-based solution to this basic ineﬃciency. The problem results from the
fact that VCs cannot commit to the eﬃcient levels of advice when they rely on the usual
equity-like contracts. In principle, as stressed by Holmstrom (1982) in the framework
7The scheme basically solves a commitment or time consistency problem. When the VC contracts
with the entrepreneur, she cannot commit to the mutually beneficial level of advice because this level is
privately not optimal anymore, when the eﬀort actually has to be expended.
8That the tax reduces advice is obvious from (15). Since this tightens ICE in (14.ii), the VC must
raise the entrepreneur’s share s to avoid loosing her eﬀort. With a smaller share for herself, she will want
to advise even less. Later on we fully take account of this interdependency, see (A.2-3) in the appendix.
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of moral hazard in teams, contracting with a third party might solve this commitment
problem.9 Since only the VC’s eﬀort is continuously variable in our setting, an eﬃcient
solution will have to make the VC the full residual claimant on the project outcome. The
key idea for such eﬃcient contracting is that the VC irrevocably gives up already at the
contracting stage an expected amount X = psV of bonus money that must be promised
to the entrepreneur to enlist her eﬀort. It is important that this money is transferred to a
third party, an outside intermediary. When it comes to the eﬀort stage, the VC can rely
on the third party to reward the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. Since the entrepreneur’s share in
profits is already prefunded, the VC can claim 100 percent of the extra project income
resulting from her advice, as is required for eﬃciency.
For whatever reasons, such institutions seem not to exist in practice. For example, we
find no hints of such arrangements in the analysis of VC contracts by Kaplan and Ström-
berg (2000). While VCs apparently assure themselves of far-reaching control rights and
use convertible instruments to participate more in the upside potential of their portfolio
companies, they seemingly do not come close to being full residual claimants. For this
reason, we do not follow the “eﬃcient venture capital model” for the rest of this paper,
but rather stay with our basic profit sharing framework.10
3 Taxation of Venture Capital
This section turns to a general equilibrium and welfare analysis of alternative tax ex-
periments. We are particularly interested in how taxes aﬀect the equilibrium number of
9In addition to Holmstrom (1982), we may also refer to McAfee and McMillan (1991). Further,
competitive intermediaries were shown to solve contractual problems in the labor market as well where
anonymous matching and ex post bargaining can lead to ineﬃcient ex ante investments of firms and
workers; see Masters (1998) for such an analysis.
10If entrepreneurial eﬀort were continuous, it would also be ineﬃciently provided. Contracting with
a third party to solve for this ineﬃciency would be precluded by the assumption that the entrepreneur
possesses no wealth at the outset. This observation constitutes an additional reason for staying with our
basic profit sharing framework and the ineﬃciency it implies.
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start-ups and how they aﬀect the involvement of VCs in their portfolio companies. The
comparative static analysis below uses ‘hats’ primarily to denote percentage changes. For
instance, aˆ ≡ da/a, gives the deviation da relative to the value a in the initial equi-
librium position with zero profits. Further, we define relative changes in tax rates as
τˆ j ≡ dτ j/ (1− τ j). To allow for zero initial values of subsidies, we also define Sˆi ≡ dSi.
We assume that full loss oﬀset is allowed in this section, ψ = ξ = 1, and that the start-up
subsidy is set to zero, z = 0, in the initial equilibrium. Appendix A lists some restric-
tions that must hold in the initial zero profit equilibrium, and that are useful in signing
comparative static eﬀects. Appendix B calculates various comparative static eﬀects from
policy changes that will be extensively referred to in the following subsections.
3.1 Uniform Capital Gains Tax
Policy makers and business practitioners often state that a capital gains tax is particularly
harmful to VC activity and the creation of innovative young firms. What are then the
eﬀects, in our framework, on the equilibrium number of start-ups and the quality of
VC finance? As a first experiment, we consider the introduction of a uniform tax on
entrepreneurs and VCs with full loss oﬀset. Hence, τE = τF = τ , starting from values of
zero, and ξ = 1. To isolate the tax eﬀects, we assume that revenues are distributed by a
uniform transfer to entrepreneurs and workers, SE = SL = S. This transfer neither aﬀects
occupational choice (see 14.i), nor the VC’s incentives to advise, nor her profits. The
subsidy thereby leaves the competitive price of innovative goods unaﬀected. The up-front
payment to entrepreneurs is B = 1 by (16) in the untaxed equilibrium. We conjecture
that a uniform capital gains tax will discourage VC support and thereby diminish welfare.
The immediate eﬀect of the capital gains tax is that it impairs the VC’s incentives to
expend eﬀort in advising the firm, aˆ = −τˆ /θ by (A.2) in the appendix. With the lack
of support, success becomes more uncertain. The entrepreneur thus requests a higher
profit share to compensate for her own critical eﬀort. This comes on top of the fact that
the tax itself diminishes the entrepreneur’s eﬀort which is secured only with a higher
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profit share, sˆ = τˆ − (1− θ) aˆ, see (A.2). Having to cede a higher equity stake to the
entrepreneur further weakens the VC’s incentives. Taking account of this interaction,
the VC cuts back support by aˆ = −τˆ / (θ − s) < 0, and raises the entrepreneur’s equity
share by sˆ = τˆ (1− s) / (θ − s), see (A.3).11 The capital gains tax erodes profits from VC
investments directly, but also by the need to cede a larger share to the entrepreneur to
secure her critical contribution, Ωˆ = −spV sˆ− [(1− s) pV − (1− z)I −B] τˆ , see (A.4).12
With the prospect of sizeable losses from their portfolio investments, VCs will fund fewer
start-ups. Furthermore, the lack of support results in higher risks and a larger rate of
business failure. Eventually, the supply contraction must raise the price of the innovative
good, or venture returns, by enough to restore profitability. According to (A.8), venture
returns increase in zero profit equilibrium by
Vˆ =
·
1− θ + θB + sI
1 + I
¸
τˆ =
·
1− (θ − s) I
1 + I
¸
τˆ > 0. (24)
Although higher venture returns would otherwise encourage more intensive advice, the
direct tax eﬀect works to reduce it and dominates in (A.3) to retard the equilibrium level
of support,
aˆ = 1θ − s
³
Vˆ − τˆ
´
= − I
1 + I τˆ < 0. (25)
The capital gains tax inflates the cost of VC backed investment. To break even, the
equilibrium price must increase as noted in (24) which chokes oﬀ demand for the innovative
good. The size of the entrepreneurial sector shrinks. Since start-ups obtain less support,
fewer of them will succeed and mature to production stage. This latter eﬀect works to
increase entrepreneurship, since a larger number of start-ups is required to accommodate
any given level of demand when the failure rate is high. Substitute (24) and (25) into
(A.10). The capital gains tax retards entrepreneurship as long as the demand elasticity η
11By (A.3), we always have θ − s > 0.
12The square bracket is positive by (A.1c).
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is not too low,13
Eˆ = −
½
(η − 1)
·
1− (θ − s) I
1 + I
¸
+
·
1− (1− s) I
1 + I
¸¾
τˆ < 0 ⇔ η > η∗, (26)
where 1 > η∗ = (1−θ)I
1+I+(1−θ+s)I > 0. Consider as a benchmark a demand elasticity of unity
which implies a smaller rate of entrepreneurship, Eˆ = − [1− (1− s) I/(1 + I)] τˆ < 0.
The capital gains tax always reduces the size of the innovative sector. It also discourages
entrepreneurship, except for a very low demand elasticity.
Since transfers boost disposable income, the welfare eﬀect depends on the amount of
revenue that the tax raises. Starting from an untaxed equilibrium, there will be no tax
base eﬀects. By the government budget constraint in (6), equal to NS = τ (pV − I)E in
the present case, the tax raises revenues in the amount of
(pV − I)Eτˆ = NSˆ. (27)
Substitute (24) and (27) into (A.11). Using (A.1c) and (26), we get
Uˆ∗ = NSˆ − pV E · Vˆ = (1− θ) spV E · aˆ < 0. (28)
The uniform capital gains tax raises the price of innovative goods and thereby reduces
welfare on account of a loss in consumer surplus. This loss is not fully compensated by the
increase in disposable income when the tax revenue is distributed to households. The first
order welfare eﬀect is strictly negative in the neighborhood of the untaxed equilibrium
and is in fact proportional to the reduction of support. This welfare result confirms the
eﬃciency analysis in section 2.3, where we argued that the double moral hazard causes
the VC to provide an ineﬃciently low level of support. Since she must share the increase
in revenues while bearing all the cost of her eﬀort, the VC provides less support than
would be socially optimal. Any policy that discourages advice even more, is bound to
inflict first order welfare losses.
13If η is near zero, the price increase would have almost no eﬀect on demand. In this case, a smaller
survival rate on account of less advice implies a higher start-up rate to accommodate demand.
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Proposition 2 (Capital Gains Tax) The capital gains tax discourages managerial ad-
vice, raises venture returns, and retards entrepreneurship. Although tax-financed transfers
boost disposable income, a small tax results in first order welfare losses on account of a
loss in consumer surplus.
Proof. See equations (24) to (28).
3.2 A Subsidy to Investment
This subsection briefly investigates another policy scenario which, perhaps surprisingly,
happens to harm welfare. Like the previous experiment it sheds some light on the mecha-
nisms triggered by public policy, the key again being how the experiment aﬀects the basic
ineﬃciency in VC support.
The policy consists in oﬀering a subsidy to physical investment I, i.e. z > 0, and
financing the subsidy by a uniform lump sum tax S < 0 (negative transfer) on workers
and entrepreneurs. This policy avoids influencing the entrepreneur’s outside option, and in
addition it also makes the deal less expensive by decreasing the total start-up investment
cost. The investment subsidy allows venture returns to fall until VCs again break even on
their investments. The lower price of innovative goods unfortunately discourages support
which deteriorates welfare in the face of an already ineﬃciently low level of VC involvement
in the market equilibrium. But entrepreneurship will be stimulated on account of both
the increase in demand following the price decline and the drop in the survival probability
associated with the cut in VC support. We state our results as:
Proposition 3 (Subsidizing Start-up Investment) A small subsidy on start-up in-
vestment zˆ > 0 that is financed by a uniform lump sum tax Sˆ < 0, lowers venture returns
and advice, stimulates entrepreneurship, but decreases welfare to the first order.
Proof. By (6), NS = −zIE, so a small subsidy starting from z = 0 is financed by
transfers of NSˆ = −IEzˆ < 0. The upfront payment B = 1 in (16) remains unchanged.
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By (A.8) and (A.9), venture returns and advice drop by Vˆ = − (θ − s) Izˆ/(1+I) and aˆ =
−Izˆ/(1+I). Substitute into (A.10) to get Eˆ = [(θ − s) η + 1− θ] Izˆ/(1+I). Substituting
Vˆ and Sˆ into (A.11) and using (A.lc) yields Uˆ∗ = −EIzˆ (1− θ) s/ [(1− s) θ] < 0, which
is again proportional to aˆ.
Most of actual policy initiatives to promote business creation involve some form of
subsidy to the cost of capital. Such policies come out rather unfavorable in our framework.
Since they are not performance-related, they are not useful in strengthening incentives for
entrepreneurial eﬀort and VC support. Quite to the contrary; since they stimulate entry,
they tend to reduce venture returns and for this reason impair incentives for eﬀort. Since
VC support is ineﬃciently low in the untaxed equilibrium, this negative feedback eﬀect
imposes a first order welfare loss.14
Finally, an obvious temptation after our two policy experiments is to combine them
in the following way: Levy a negative capital gains tax and finance the implied revenue
subsidy by a tax, not a subsidy, on physical investment of VC-backed start-ups. It should
be clear from propositions 2 and 3 that this combined policy of a ‘self-financed revenue
subsidy to start-ups’ has the potential to raise welfare. While the revenue subsidy directly
boosts incentives for eﬀort, the start-up tax can aﬀect incentives only indirectly via the
induced equilibrium price eﬀect. The net eﬀect is almost surely to strengthen VC advice
which must raise welfare when advice is too low in the untaxed equilibrium.
4 Tax Cut Cum Loss Oﬀset Restriction
The policy proposal just mentioned of a self-financed revenue subsidy to start-ups may
be unrealistic although it is specifically targeted at the problem of inadequate quality of
14Actual policy, however, might be motivated in part by the expectation of positive spillover eﬀects
from entry of innovative entrepreneurial firms in the output market. In this case, the investment subsidy
might have a more constructive role to play, with the positive externality eﬀect partly or fully oﬀsetting
the negative incentive eﬀect.
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VC finance and, at the same time, does not put a net burden on the general tax payer.
Furthermore, most countries do apply a capital gains tax or they subject capital gains
to the general income tax. The previous analysis revealed that the capital gains tax
is particularly harmful because it exacerbates a preexisting market distortion. We now
suggest another targeted and self-financed policy initiative that should yield welfare gains.
Suppose a positive capital gains tax with full loss oﬀset is in place. We propose to cut
the tax rate on VC funds τF while at the same time restricting loss oﬀset (reducing ξ and
hence ψ below unity), so that the combined policy change is revenue neutral. In this way,
VCs pay themselves for the tax cut they receive, without putting a burden on the general
budget. The proposal exploits the fact that VC investments are inherently risky and VC
funds always end up registering losses in some firms and substantial revenues in others.
By raising the tax cost of business failure, the loss oﬀset restriction punishes financiers
for lack of advice and for letting companies fail. The lower capital gains tax boosts the
marginal benefit of advice. Hence, the policy of tax cut cum loss oﬀset restriction gives a
double kick as both elements encourage advice.
To be more precise, suppose that VCs are subject to a capital gains tax with full loss
oﬀset, τF > 0 and ξ = 1, while τE = 0.15 The tax finances a uniform subsidy to workers
and entrepreneurs, S > 0, which is kept constant. The policy proposal broadens the tax
base by limiting loss oﬀset, ξˆ < 0, and uses the additional revenues to cut the tax rate,
τˆF < 0. The reform is revenue neutral without any burden to the general tax payer.
Since we start from a taxed equilibrium, we have to take account of tax base eﬀects which
complicates the analysis relative to the experiments in section 3.
To follow the eﬀects of the policy, we begin by considering the impact on advice in
15In reality, the scenario would start with a uniform capital gains tax τF = τE > 0 and then stimulate
advice with a selective tax break to VCs only. Having τE > 0 would, however, introduce additional
tax base eﬀects and considerably complicate the analysis without fundamentally altering the analysis.
Similarly, a cut in a uniform capital gains tax on both entrepreneurs and VCs, financed by restricting
loss oﬀset, will generate the same qualitative eﬀects on key variables as the ones we derive below. In the
experiment, we also set z = 0, while SE = SL = S.
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(A.3). Both the tax cut and the loss oﬀset restriction boost advice which also allows for a
lower equity share to the entrepreneur on account of lower survival risk. In (A.4), we find
that both the tax cut and the reduction of the entrepreneur’s share boost VC profits while
the loss oﬀset restriction erodes profits. If the net eﬀect on profits is positive, which will
depend on the relative size of the shocks to τF and ξ, the rents in VC investing attract
additional activity and expands aggregate supply until venture returns, i.e. the prices
of innovative goods, are competed down to the break-even level stated in (A.8). Lower
prices expand the innovative sector. When a larger fraction of start-ups is successful on
account of more intensive support, fewer firms need to be started to satisfy any given
level of demand. It is thus unclear, a priori, whether the policy raises the number of
entrepreneurs or not. All these equilibrium adjustments aﬀect the tax base and determine
the extent of the tax cut that can be financed with the loss oﬀset restriction. After several
calculations in Appendix C, we find
τˆF = τ
F
1− τF
(1− p) θ
1−θ + τF [θ − η (θ − s) + η (1− s) pθ]
1− τF + τF (1− η) (1− θ) ξˆ. (29)
As a benchmark case, consider a price elasticity of demand for the innovative good equal
to unity, η = 1. In this case, the coeﬃcient is unambiguously positive. The loss oﬀset
restriction ξˆ < 0 indeed allows to finance a cut in the capital gains tax, τˆF < 0. In
principle, however, an ambiguity might emerge if the initial tax rate is very high and the
demand elasticity is considerably diﬀerent from unity.
We have now established the relative size of the policy shocks and may substitute (29)
into (A.8) to obtain the equilibrium price eﬀect. Collecting terms and noting that all
terms proportional to ητF cancel out, we eventually get
Vˆ = τ
F
1− τF
£
s+ (1− s) θτF
¤
(1− pθ)
1− τF + τF (1− η) (1− θ) ξˆ. (30)
Again, the denominator is positive for 1 = η. An ambiguity could emerge in the unlikely
case where an excessively large demand elasticity would coincide with a large initial tax
rate. We conclude that the net result of the tax cut cum loss oﬀset restriction on the
price of innovative goods is negative which verifies our discussion prior to (29).
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Less attractive venture returns will weaken the incentives of VCs to provide support.
However, the policy’s direct impact in (A.3) is for more advice. Substituting (29) into
(A.9), we get the equilibrium response in advice,
aˆ = − τ
F
1− τF
(1− p) θ
1−θ + 1− τFη (1− s) (1− pθ)
1− τF + τF (1− η) (1− θ) ξˆ. (31)
Again, the numerator is positive for η = 1 since (1− s) (1− pθ) is smaller than one. It
seems inconceivable that the demand elasticity and the tax rate could ever be so large that
the last term would dominate the first two terms in the numerator. The policy initiative
thus stimulates equilibrium advice which was its main intention in the first place.
We have so far recorded a larger innovative sector on account of a lower competitive
goods price, as well as a larger survival rate on account of more intensive VC involvement
in start-ups. Substituting (29) into (A.15), we find that fewer firms need to be started to
supply the larger market since more of these start-ups make it to the production stage,
Eˆ =
£
1− η
¡
s+ (1− s) τF
¢¤
(1− pθ)
1− τF + τF (1− η) (1− θ)
τF
1− τF ξˆ. (32)
Again, the eﬀect is unambiguous, provided that η and τF are not too large.
Proposition 4 (Tax Cut Cum Loss Oﬀset Restriction) Restricting loss oﬀset and
cutting the capital gains tax rate boosts advice, impairs entrepreneurship, lowers the price,
and raises welfare.
Proof. Use ξˆ < 0 in equations (30) to (32). Refer to (A.11) for the welfare eﬀect
where transfers are kept constant, SˆL = SˆE = 0. The welfare gain reflects an increased
consumer surplus from innovative goods.
5 Conclusions
The recent years witnessed increased interest in and awareness of the role of venture capital
in promoting entrepreneurship and start-up investment. The ups and downs of the stock
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markets notwithstanding, new firms hold considerable promise for developing new ideas
that will eventually translate into new jobs. Apart from the lack of own resources, the
commercial inexperience of would-be entrepreneurs is a major barrier to the creation and
growth of new firms. While entrepreneurs tend to be technically well trained, they often
lack the managerial know-how to turn their new firms into veritable growth companies.
Venture capital can importantly add value by promoting the professionalization of young
firms. Empirical evidence in the U.S. clearly points to the potential value-added of venture
capital. New firms that are backed by venture capital are less likely to fail, grow more
quickly and end up more profitable than other ventures. By way of contrast, the few
studies that have investigated the recent development of European venture capital, have
failed to uncover similar evidence. Although there is reason to expect a similar growth
enhancing role of venture capital as in the U.S., the conditions for a successful operation
of venture capital in Europe must be improved.
This paper emphasized an ineﬃciency in venture capital support when the joint inputs
of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in start-up firms are simultaneously supplied and
are non-verifiable and not contractible in nature. When the marginal cost of extra eﬀort
is fully private, but venture capitalists must share with entrepreneurs the return on this
increased engagement, incentives for advisory eﬀort must suﬀer. The capital gains tax
aggravates this ineﬃciency. It not only retards entrepreneurship but also leads to a
first-order welfare loss. However, once a capital gains tax is in place, there is scope for
reducing the ineﬃciency. Instead of conceding full loss oﬀset, as is often demanded, one
could actually contemplate to restrict it. The revenue so generated could be used to lower
the capital gains tax rate. The package would deliver a double kick to venture capitalists:
On one hand, the lower tax would stimulate advice directly; on the other hand, the limited
loss oﬀset would punish VCs for letting some businesses fail.
Another initiative often advocated by policy makers is to stimulate the volume of
capital raised and the number of start-ups by such measures as interest subsidies, credit
guarantees or direct investment tax credits. In our framework, however, a subsidy to
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physical investment of start-up firms is detrimental to welfare although it succeeds to boost
entrepreneurship. Because it is successful in expanding the innovative sector by raising
the number of start-ups, it eventually erodes venture returns which, in turn, impairs the
venture capitalists’ incentives for support. The investment subsidy thus aggrevates a
preexisting distortion with respect to advice. In fact, an investment tax would be called
for.
We do not wish to claim that our insights are easily transformed into practical tax pol-
icy. Making sure that loss oﬀset will indeed be restricted could be diﬃcult, if incorporated
venture capital companies can oﬀset losses with gains within the company. Similarly, po-
tentially desirable cuts in capital gains taxes or taxes on physical investment in start-ups
would not be easy to target. But the central message remains that capital gains taxes
undermine the quality of venture capital and are particularly harmful to innovative new
firms for reasons that have not previously been highlighted.
Appendix
To conserve space, we throughout the Appendix use the notation Q ≡ (1 − z)I + B for
the VC’s initial outlays or equity price.
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A. Equilibrium Restrictions
A zero profit equilibrium with full loss oﬀset, ψ = ξ = 1, and z = 0, fulfills16
(a) (9) ap0 = (1− θ) p,
(b) (15) ICF a =
¡
1− τF
¢
(1− θ) (1− s) pV,
(c) (14) Ω = 0 Q = (1− s) pV θ,
(d) (14.ii) ICE β =
¡
1− τE
¢
spV,
(e) (b) / (c) a =
¡
1− τF
¢
1−θ
θ Q,
(f) (d) / (c) s
1−s =
βθ
(1−τE)Q .
(A.1)
B. Comparative Statics
Appendix B prepares the comparative static eﬀects of the policy scenarios given in sections
3 and 4. In all cases it is assumed that full loss oﬀset is in place initially, ψ = ξ = 1. We
also use the functional form noted in (9), giving pˆ = (1− θ) aˆ and pˆ0 = −θaˆ.
Advice and Profit Share: As noted in section 2.2.3, the incentive constraints (14.ii)
and (15) simultaneously determine a and s. Log-linearization yields
ICE : sˆ = τˆE − Vˆ − (1− θ) aˆ,
ICF : θaˆ = Vˆ − τˆF − s
1−s sˆ−
τF
1−τF θpξˆ,
(A.2)
Use (15) which is p0 (a)
¡
1− τF
¢
(1− s)V = 1 with full loss oﬀset, and (A.1c), to simplify
the coeﬃcient of ξˆ. Restricting loss oﬀset, ξˆ < 0, thus raises advice, ceteris paribus.
Solving the system (A.2) for the equilibrium adjustment of aˆ and sˆ gives
aˆ = 1θ−s
h
Vˆ − (1− s) τˆF − sτˆE − τF
1−τF (1− s) θpξˆ
i
, θ − s > 0,
sˆ = 1−sθ−s
h
(1− θ) τˆF + θτˆE − Vˆ + τF
1−τF (1− θ) θpξˆ
i
.
(A.3)
To sign θ − s, suppose a increases, for example, because loss oﬀset is restricted. With
a higher success rate, entrepreneurs require a lower share s by ICE in (A.2). The VC
16Multiply (15) by a and use (A.1a) to get (A.1b). Replace a by (A.1b) in (14) to get (A.1c) for Ω = 0.
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correspondingly obtains a higher share 1− s which further strengthens her incentives to
advise. This cycle converges if θ − s > 0. This interdependency gives rise to interesting
cross-properties. The loss oﬀset restriction, for example, does not directly aﬀect the
entrepreneur’s incentives in (A.2). However, since it discourages the VC’s advice, the
success rate declines. With a smaller survival chance, the entrepreneur must receive a
larger profit share to prevent shirking. Furthermore, raising the tax rate τE does not
directly aﬀect the VC. However, when the entrepreneur’s reward for high eﬀort is taxed,
the VC must again cede a higher profit share to prevent shirking. This diminishes the
VC’s own stake and, in turn, her incentives to give advice.
Zero Profit Equilibrium: Although policy influences advice, the envelope theorem
prevents, on account of (15), that a variation of a aﬀects profits. This is not the case with
respect to the share s which is imposed on the VC by the entrepreneur’s ICE in (14.ii).
Accordingly, VC profits in (14) change by [note ψˆ = (1− p) ξˆ, and Ωˆ = dΩ]
Ωˆ
1− τF = (1− s) pV Vˆ − spV sˆ− [(1− s) pV −Q] τˆ
F −QQˆ+ τ
F (1− p)Q
1− τF ξˆ. (A.4)
Substitute sˆ from (A.3), collect terms, set Ωˆ = 0, and get the equilibrium price that
results from free entry competing profits down to zero. Use (A.1c) to simplify coeﬃcients,
Q
θ − sVˆ =
1− θ
θ − sQτˆ
F +
s
θ − sQτˆ
E +QQˆ+
τF
h
(1−θ)sp
θ−s − (1− p)
i
1− τF Qξˆ. (A.5)
Rearranging yields
Vˆ = (1− θ) τˆF + sτˆE + (θ − s) Qˆ+ τF (1− s) pθ − (θ − s)
1− τF ξˆ. (A.6)
Reflecting the entrepreneur’s outside option, the upfront payment in (16) changes by
Bˆ = τˆE + Sˆ
L − SˆE
(1− τE)B, Qˆ =
B
QBˆ −
(1− z) I
Q zˆ, (A.7)
which also aﬀects VC profits and competitive returns V . Substituting into (A.6), we have
Vˆ = (1− θ) τˆF + θB+s(1−z)IQ τˆ
E + θ−s
(1−τE)Q
³
SˆL − SˆE
´
− (θ−s)(1−z)IQ zˆ +
τF
1−τF [(1− s) pθ − (θ − s)] ξˆ.
(A.8)
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The competitive price adjustment feeds back into advice and profit sharing. Substi-
tuting (A.8) into (A.3), we get profit sharing and advice in zero profit equilibrium
aˆ = BQ τˆ
E − τˆF + SˆL−SˆE
(1−τE)Q −
(1−z)I
Q zˆ −
τF
1−τF ξˆ,
1
1−s sˆ =
(1−z)I
Q τˆ
E − SˆL−SˆE
(1−τE)Q +
(1−z)I
Q zˆ +
τF (1−pθ)
1−τF ξˆ.
(A.9)
The competitive price generates demand according to (11) which attracts an equilib-
rium number of entrepreneurs to clear the market for innovative goods as in (2). A policy
shock thus changes entrepreneurship by
Eˆ = −ηVˆ − (1− θ) aˆ. (A.10)
Finally, the eﬀect on welfare results from (18) and reflects disposable income and
consumer surplus from consumption of innovative goods. By (13), dCS = −DdV . Using
ND = pE, we obtain from (18)
dU∗ ≡ Uˆ∗ = NSˆL − pV E · Vˆ . (A.11)
C. Tax Cut Cum Loss Oﬀset Restriction
This Appendix calculates the eﬀects resulting from a capital gains tax cut financed with
a loss oﬀset restriction. The scenario starts from a situation where a capital gains tax τF
on VCs with full loss oﬀset finances uniform transfers S = SL = SE that is kept constant.
Other policy instruments are set to zero, τE = z = 0. With this scenario, the equity price
Q = 1 + I also remains constant. The government budget in (6) simplifies to
τF [(1− s) pV − ψQ]E = NS, ψ = p+ (1− p) ξ. (A.12)
Multiply the budget (A.12) by
¡
1− τF
¢ θ
Q , substitute the zero profit condition (A.2c’)
and use the definition of ψ to get
¡
1− τF
¢ θNS
Q = τ
F £1− θψ − (1− θ) ξτF ¤E. (A.13)
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Full loss oﬀset would result in NS = τF 1−θθ QE. Next, take the diﬀerential and evaluate
the coeﬃcients at the position ψ = ξ = 1. Also use ψˆ = (1− p) ξˆ at ξ = 1,
−θNSQ τˆ
F = (1− θ)
h
E
¡
1− τF
¢
τˆF + τFEEˆ
i
− τF
1−τFE
h
θ (1− p) ξˆ + (1− θ)
³
τF ξˆ +
¡
1− τF
¢
τˆF
´i
.
Now replace NS by (A.13) at ψ = 1 and cancel terms to obtain
τˆF = τ
F
1− τF
·
θ (1− p) + (1− θ) τF
(1− θ) (1− τF ) ξˆ − Eˆ
¸
. (A.14)
With the loss oﬀset restriction ξˆ < 0 being exogenous, the eﬀects on the tax rate τˆF ,
advice aˆ, venture returns Vˆ , and number of start-ups Eˆ are simultaneously determined
by the system (A.8), (A.9), (A.10), and (A.14), where all other policy parameters except
τˆF and ξˆ are set to zero. Substituting (A.8) and (A.9) into (A.10) yields
Eˆ = (1− η) (1− θ) τˆF + τ
F
1− τF [(1− θ)− η (1− s) pθ + η (θ − s)] ξˆ, (A.15)
which we substitute into (A.14) to get (29) in the text.
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